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ABSTRACT 
Relevance Theory assumes different processing models for similar utterances without 
motivating the discrepancy (see Giora, 1998). On some occasions (e.g., Sperber and 
Wilson, 1986/95: 237), it seems to assume a direct access model upon which the 
contextually appropriate interpretation (e.g., the figurative interpretation of metaphor) is 
accessed directly without having to process a contextually inappropriate interpretation, 
(e.g., the literal meaning of metaphor). On other occasions (Sperber and Wilson 1986/95: 
242), it seems to assume a special sequential model upon which the contextually 
inappropriate meaning or structure is involved in deriving the intended meaning. The 
graded salience hypothesis (Giora, 1997) may help reconcile the inconsistency. According 
to the graded salience hypothesis, salient (i.e., coded) meanings of words or expressions 
(whose degree of salience is affected by e.g., frequency, familiarity, conventionality) and 
salient (e.g., frequent) structures should always be accessed and always first, regardless 
of contextual bias or speaker's intent. According to the graded salience hypothesis, direct 
process should apply when salient information is intended, i.e., when salient information 
is compatible with contextual information. Sequential process should be induced when less 
salient meanings are intended (e.g., the literal meaning of conventional idioms). On such 
occasions, salient meanings would not be bypassed; Rather, they would be activated first, 
rejected as the intended meaning and reinterpreted in consistency with the Principie of 
Relevance. Given the graded salience hypothesis, processes consistent with the Principie 
of Relevance may apply at different temporal moments of understanding, depending on the 
salience status of the discourse components involved. 
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The 'standard pragmatic model' (notably Grice, 1975; Searle, 1979) and the Relevance 
Theoretic account (notably Sperberand Wilson, 1985/96) both assume, among other things, 
that "the role of pragmatic theory is to explain how the hearer recognises the intended 
interpretation of an utterance" (Smith and Wilson, 1992: 8). They seem, however, to differ 
over the role context plays in utterance interpretation. Sperber and Wilson assume that the 
context (the set of contextual assumptions) "is generally not fixed in advance: it has to be 
constructed as part of the interpretation process. Sperber and Wilson see this as yet another 
way in which the interpretation of an utterance in underdetermined by what is linguistically 
encoded, and argüe that context construction is governed by the same general principies that 
affect the recovery of explicit contení and implicatures." (Smith and Wilson, 1992: 3). 
As illustration, consider (1) — a remark once made by Mrs. Thatcher in a radio 
interview, cited and analyzed by Smith and Wilson (1992: 3): 
(1) I always treat other people's money as if it were my own. 
The interpretation of this utterance will be significantly affected by the contextual 
assumptions brought to bear. On the assumption that Mrs Thatcher treats her own money 
very carefully, it will implicate that she treats other people's money very carefully; on the 
assumption that she spends her own money in any way she chooses, it will implicate that she 
spends other people's money in any way she chooses, and so on. 
According to the Relevance Theoretic account cited here, context directs utterance 
interpretation entirely; The conventional (coded) meaning of Thatcher's utterance 
(denoting/implying careful treatment of other people's money, regardless of context) is 
bypassed. Instead, what affects interpretation is the contextual information, i.e., the 
hearer's contextual assumption(s) about Thatcher's demeanor. 
Assigning to context such a role in utterance interpretation is consistent with the direct 
access view of the lexical processes involved in comprehension (e.g., Simpson, 1981; 
Glucksberg, Kreuz and Rho, 1986; Jones, 1991). Research into lexical access and 
ambiguity resolution has shown that context affects interpretation significantly. Heavily 
biasing contexts inhibit contextually inappropriate meanings so that only the intended 
meaning is made available for comprehension. Comprehension of ambiguous words 
embedded in a rich and supportive context did not involve a contextually inappropriate 
stage. Accessing the intended meaning directly, without recourse to the word's múltiple 
meanings suggests that contextpre-selects the contextually appropriate meaning so that only 
the intended — contextually compatible — meaning is made available for comprehension. 
Such view must assume equivalent processes for e.g., literal and figurative language. 
If context affects comprehension completely, comprehenders should compute only the 
intended, contextually appropriate or optimally relevant meaning, be it literal or figurative, 
depending on the contextual bias. Interpreting nonliteral language, then, need not involve 
a contextually inappropriate (e.g., literal) stage at all. It should, therefore, take no longer 
to process than literal language, and should require no special process (cf. Sperber and 
Wilson's (1986/95: 239). For the purpose of this discussion, let us focus on irony 
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comprehension. As illustration, consider the ironic and literal discourses in 2 and 3, cited 
and analyzed in Sperber and Wilson's (1986/95: 239): 
(2)(a) He: It's a lovely day for a picnic. 
[They go for a picnic and the sun shines.] 
(2)(b) She: (happily): It's a lovely day for a picnic, indeed. 
(3)(a) He: It's a lovely day for a picnic. 
[They go for a picnic and it rains.] 
(3)(b) She: (sarcastically): It's a lovely day for a picnic, indeed. 
In both (2b) and (3 b) there is an echoic allusion to be picked up. In the circumstances 
described, it is clear that the speaker of (2b) endorses the opinión echoed, whereas the 
speaker of (3 b) rejects it with scorn. These utterances are interpreted on exactly similar 
patterns; the only difference is in the attitudes they express. (2b) has not been thought of by 
rhetoricians to be worthy of special attention; (3b) is, of course, a case of irony. 
Indeed, empirical evidence obtained for the last two decades seems to nave lent support 
to the direct access account regarding nonliteral language. In all, figurative and literal 
language nave been shown to involve similar processes (see Gibbs, 1994 for a review). Like 
literal meanings, metaphoric meanings have been shown to be processed automatically 
(Gildeaand Glucksberg, 1983; Glucksberg, Gildea and Bookin, 1982; Keysar, 1989) and 
to involve the same categorization procedures (Glucksberg and Keysar, 1990; Shen, 1997). 
Further, metaphors and idioms and their literal interpretation were shown to take equally 
long to read when embedded in a rich and supportive context (Kemper, 1981; Inhoff, Lima 
and Carroll, 1984; Ortony, Schallert, Reynolds and Antos, 1978). And irony was no 
exception: It was found to take no longer to read than its literal equivalent (Gibbs, 1986a,b; 
Gibbs et al., 1995). 
Pragmaticians advocating the direct access view argüe against 'the standard pragmatic 
model' (notably Grice, 1975 and Searle, 1979 and see also e.g., Bredin, 1997 and criticism 
thereof; Dascal, 1987, 1989). According to Grice and Searle, comprehenders compute the 
sentence (literal) meaning first, regardless of contextual bias. If it is compatible with the 
situation or context, it is accepted as the intended meaning and search is stopped. If it is 
incompatible with the context, it is rejected and replaced by a compatible nonliteral 
meaning. In this framework, literal meaning enjoys a privileged status - it is always 
activated and always initially. Interpreting nonliteral language such as metaphor, irony, or 
indirect requests should, therefore, involve a special sequeníial process. It should take 
longer than interpreting literal language which requires no reinterpretation phase. 
The standard pragmatic model is consistent with the modular view (cf. Fodor, 1983) 
which maintains that lexical processes are autonomous: Context does not affect the initial 
access of a word's coded meanings. Rather, it selects the appropriate meaning after the 
word's meanings have been retrieved (Gernsbacher, 1990; Keysar, Barr, Balin and Paek 
in press; Onifer and Swinney, 1981; Rayner, Pacht and Duffy, 1994; Swinney, 1979). 
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Findings supporting the modular view regarding irony comprehension include different 
reading times and different reaction times to literally and ironically related probes. For 
example, Dews and Winner (1997) and Giora, Fein and Schwartz (1998) found longer 
reading times for utterances in ironically than in literally biasing contexts (and see also 
reinterpretation of Gibbs', 1986a findings in Giora, 1995). In addition, Giora et al. (1998) 
found facilitation for literally related concepts displayed 150 msec after offset of target 
sentences in ironically and literally biasing contexts. However, at a later stage — 2000 msec 
after offset of the target sentence (in the contexts biasing the meaning towards the ironic 
interpretation) — the ironic meaning became available and the literal meaning was still as 
active. Such findings support the view that ironies are initially processed only literally (and 
see also Giora and Fein, in press a). 
Findings supporting the modular view regarding novel metaphor comprehension include 
different reading times and different reaction times to literally and metaphorically related 
probes. For example, Giora, Fein and Schwartz (in prep.) found longer reading times for 
novel metaphors than for their literal interpretations. Blasko and Connine (1993) found that 
the literal meanings of novel metaphors were facilitated immediately (0-350 msec after 
offset of the target sentences), while their metaphoric meanings became available only at 
a later stage (750 msec after offset of the target sentences). Such findings support the view 
that novel metaphors are processed only literally initially. 
Moreover, familiar metaphors which, indeed, took no longer to read than their literal 
interpretations, were found to access the literal meaning initially, in parallel to their 
metaphoric meaning, in spite of contextual bias (Blasko and Connine, 1993), and see also 
Giora and Fein, in press b for converging evidence). Such findings support the view that 
conventional metaphors are processed metaphorically and literally initially. 
How can Relevance theory account for such findings? On the face of it, Relevance 
theory seems to be consistent with a sequential as well as a direct access model (for similar 
criticism see also Giora, 1998): Recall that according to Sperber and Wilson (1986/95: 
239), irony interpretation requires no special process. However, according to Smith and 
Wilson (1992), the opposite is true: Here, processing metaphor and irony does involve a 
special/sequential process: 
Let us assume that, in interpreting an utterance, the hearer starts with a small initial 
context left over, say, from his processing of the previous utterance: he computes the 
contextual effects of the utterance in that initial context; if these are not enough to make 
the utterance worth his attention, he expands the context, obtaining further effects, and 
repeats the processes until he has enough effects to make the utterance optimally relevant 
in the way that the speaker could manifestly have foreseen. (7, emphasis added) 
The interpretation of metaphor and irony involves an element of indirectness. For 
example, the metaphor 'John is a lion' may communicate indirectly that John is brave. This 
element of indirectness calis for extra processing effort on the part of the hearer, which... 
will be offset by extra effect. (8) 
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How can such conflicting views be resolved? Giora (1997, in press) and Giora et al. 
(1998) proposed a more general view of language comprehension which postulates the 
priority of salient (rather than literal) meanings (for a similar view see Jurafsky, 1996; 
Récanati, 1995; Turner and Katz, 1997). A word's salient meanings are those coded in the 
mental lexicón. Their degree of salience may be affected by e.g., conventionality, 
familiarity, frequency, or prior context (which is instrumental in enhancing but not in 
inhibiting coded meanings). According to the graded salience hypothesis (Giora, 1997), 
salient meanings should always be accessed and always first, regardless of contextual bias. 
The salience hypothesis, thus, predicts that less familiar, non-salient ironies should be 
processed literally initially. However, salient, familiar ironies such as wise guy, big deal 
(whose ironic meaning is coded) should be accessed directly. Giora and Fein (1998) indeed 
showed that salient ironies facilitated their salient ironic meaning shortly (150 msec) after 
offset of the ironic target, in parallel to their salient literal meaning. In contrast, non-salient 
ironies facilitated only their salient literal meaning immediately, i.e., 150 msec after offset 
of the ironic target; their non-salient ironic meaning was facilitated at a later stage - 1000 
msec after offset of the ironic target sentence. 
Giora et al. (1998) and Giora and Fein (1998) have also shown that the salient, 
contextually incompatible (literal) meaning of irony is not suppressed when the ironic 
meaning emerges. Findings from naturally occurring conversations further support the view 
that the activated literal meaning of irony is not suppressed, but retained. In studying 
conversations between friends, Kotthoff (1998a,b) has shown that listeners' responses very 
often resonate with the literal meaning of the immediately preceding ironic utterance while 
at the same time making it clear that they have also understood the implicated meaning. 
Findings by Giora and Gur (1998) corrobórate Kotthoff s findings, showing that, more 
often than not, irony is responded to by resonating with its salient literal interpretation. 
The graded salience hypothesis indeed posits equivalent activation processes for 
similarly salient discourses, regardless of whether they are literal or non-literal.2 Giora 
(1997) has shown that the distinction of interest which best explains the various conflicting 
findings in the field of literal and figurative language understanding is not the 
metaphoric/literal divide, but rather the salient/non-salient continuum. Under certain 
circumstances, figurative and literal language behave alike. For instance, less conventional 
metaphors and conventional idioms used unconventionally behave like highly conventional 
literal language used innovatively: They were all found to involve a sequential process. On 
the other hand, conventional metaphors, less conventional idioms, and less conventional 
literal language used innovatively were found to involved a parallel process. Conventional 
idioms and conventional literal language, which are instances of conventional language 
intended conventionally were shown to be accessed directly (cf. Blasko and Connine, 1993; 
Gerrig, 1989; Gibbs, 1980; McGlone, Glucksberg and Cacciari, 1994). 
To account for such conflicting findings in a consistent manner, Relevance Theory will 
have to incorpórate the graded salience assumption. Within this integrated framework, the 
direct, (presumably context- sensitive) and the autonomous (context-insensitive) processes 
may occur at different moments of understanding. Context sensitive processes should be 
90 Revista Alicantina de Estudios Ingleses 
viewed as monitoring the iniüal autonomous access phase so that they affect interpretation 
only after salient meanings/structures have been activated. In the case of e.g., conventional 
metaphors and ironies, when the figurative meaning is intended, this implies direct access. 
Since the nonliteral meanings of conventional /familiar metaphors (e.g., 'Richard is a lion') 
and ironies (e.g., 'wise guy') are salient, they should be accessed initially (and effortlessly; 
for a different view see Smith and Wilson, 1992: 8). Since they are also the intended 
meaning, they should not be revised at the monitoring stage, and henee require no special 
process.3 Less lámiliar and non-familiar language should involve a sequential process upon 
which the more salient (albeitunintended) meaning should be accessed first, before the non-
salient intended meaning is derived (e.g., less-familiar ironies, novel metaphors, literally 
intended idioms as evinced by Giora et al., 1998; Blasko and Connine, 1993 and Gibbs, 
1980, respectively). 
Similarly, the processes involved in interpreting Thatcher's remark (that she always 
treats other people's money as if it were her own, cf. Example 1) should involve accessing 
initially the conventional/salient meaning of the remark (which implicates treatment of other 
people's money with care). Since this is also her intended meaning, it should not be revised 
(butselected as the optimally relevant interpretation). However, the addressee entertaining 
the contextual assumption that she is not careful about money will probably deduce (on bis 
own account) that she is lying, yet he cannot "jump" to this conclusión by bypassing the 
salient meaning or implication of the remark (as implied by Smith & Wilson's analysis, see 
above). 
One could argüe that lexical access is irrelevant to pragmatics theory. However, given 
the findings above, a dismissal of lexical processes as irrelevant to utterance interpretation 
is unwarranted. The sequential process found by Giora et al., 1998 does not imply that a full 
recovery and rejection of the sentence literal meaning is necessary before computation of 
the nonliteral meaning begins. What these findings show is that the contextually 
incompatible (literal) meaning of (irony), which is not inhibited by context, is also not 
suppressed by the emergence of the intended (ironic) meaning (as would be predicted by 
Grice and by the proponents of the modular view). Such findings suggest that the 
contextually incompatible literal meaning may have some role in deriving the ironic 
interpretation (as proposed by Giora, 1995, Dews and Winner, 1995; Dews, Kaplan and 
Winner, 1995). 
Further, the same processes that were found to be involved in ambiguous and figurative 
language interpretation have been found to affect anaphora disambiguation. For example, 
Keysar, Barr, Balin and Paek (in press) show that while searching for anaphor antecedent, 
the comprehender accesses the most accessible/salient candidate made available by their 
immediately present context, even though this referent may not be reasonably intended by 
the speaker. Expansión of the context, at a later stage, avails the alternative, next most 
accessible candidate, which could also be part of the speaker's and hearer's mutual 
knowledge, i.e., could be intended by the speaker. As illustration, consider the following 
example (taken form Keysar et al. in press): 
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(4) It is evening, and Boris' young daughter is playing in the other room. Boris, who 
lives in Chicago, is thinking of calling his lover in Europe. He decides not to cali 
because she is probably asleep given the transatlantic time difference. At that 
moment his wife returns home and asks, "Is she asleep?" 
Keysar et al. (in press) show that retrieving the contextually appropriate referent (i.e., 
the daughter) is slowed down when there is a more accessible albeit contextually 
inappropriate candidate (i.e., the lover) than the one that could be intended by the speaker. 
In Relevance Theory terms, that can be taken to show that the Principie of Relevance (which 
directs the search for the interpretation that the speaker could manifestly have foreseen) 
does not affect initial access. Rather, it monitors the comprehension process following the 
initial access stage. If the most accessible interpretation is consistent with the Principie of 
Relevance, no revisión is required. However, if it is not, it is adjusted and redressed. 
Horton & Keysar (1996) further show that such processes are also involved in discourse 
production. They assume an Initial Design stage which is not amenable to change under 
time pressure, and a Monitoring and Adjustment stage which is. Indeed, initial plan is 
shown to involve information that is available to the speaker rather than (mostly) 
information that might be relevant to the addressee. Tapping information that is consistent 
with the Principie of Relevance is shown to be induced when the speaker has enough time 
to monitor and adjust her utterances. 
Note that upon the graded salience hypothesis both, the direct access model and the 
sequential model should involve initial access stage that is autonomous and impervious to 
context effects. Whereas upon the direct access model, this information is accidentally 
compatible with contextual information and speaker's intention, upon the sequential model 
it is not. Though the original direct access model, which is context sensitive, is much more 
appealing, allowing for context to direct comprehension completely, and consequently spare 
the comprehender the monitoring and adjustment phase, it is probably not the one guiding 
our language processing (for a similar view see Keysar, 1994). Keysar, Barr & Horton (in 
press) suggest that though "counterintuitive, such error prone processes reflect the 
information processing limitations of the mind. As Simón (1956; 1982) argued, the mind 
"satisfices": It sol ves problems heuristically using strategies that are not error proof but are 
typically cost efficient (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974)" and often successñil, though 
occasionally erroneous. 
Processes consistent with the Principie of Relevance may, then, occur at different 
temporal phases of the comprehension course. Tapping the optimally relevant interpretation 
may occur directly, i.e., instantly and effortlessly, e.g., when salient/accessible information 
is also (accidentally) the intended one - the one consistent with the Principie of Relevance. 
Or it may require a special (e.g., sequential) effortful processes, e.g., when 
salient/accessible information is incompatible with contextual information or speaker's 
intention and has to be revisited. Processes consistent with the Principie of Relevance may 
apply, then, at different temporal moments of understanding, depending on the salience 
status of the discourse components involved. 
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Notes 
1. This study was supported by The Israel Science Foundation (grant no. 891/96-7). I would 
also like to thank Boaz Keysar for his very helpful comments. 
2. Note, however, that the graded salience hypothesis has no predictions as to the processes 
of retention or suppression (of tlie activated meanings/constructions) that are involved in 
interpreting e.g., ambiguity, metaphor, irony, joke, etc. 
3. On the neurological aspects of monitoring see Zaidel (1987). 
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